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Abstract 
Winding-up or liquidation is the process by which the company’s life is terminated and its property administered, 
for the benefit of its creditors, members and other interested parties.  The liquidator is the principal officer 
involved in the winding-up proceedings and it is obvious that he has to perform his functions and exercise his 
powers effectively and without abuse, in order to address the claims of all the parties satisfactorily.  This paper 
therefore evaluates the status and role of the liquidator in the winding-up of companies in Nigeria.  It also 
proffers suggestions on the measures to be adopted to achieve effectiveness in the exercise of his powers and 
performance of his functions for the overall benefit of all the interested parties in the winding-up proceedings. 
Keywords:  Legal status, Powers and functions, Liquidators, Winding-up of Companies. 
 
1. Introduction 
The liquidator is unarguably the most important actor in the process of winding-up of companies.  His role is not 
only significant but almost indispensable in every mode of winding-up, whether compulsory winding-up, 1 
voluntary winding-up2 or winding–up, subject to the court’s supervision.  Indeed, the liquidator’s powers, as 
specified in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 3  (CAMA), are enormous and therefore susceptible to 
misapplication and outright abuse.    
The CAMA has actually made provisions for the supervision and control of the liquidator by the court 
and the Committee of Inspection, among others, in the performance of his duties and exercise of his powers, as 
liquidator.  However, complaints and disenchantments among the creditors and other interested parties in the 
winding-up process in relation to the high-handedness and abuse of power by liquidators point to lack of 
effective supervision and control of the liquidators.  As the officer responsible for conducting the winding-up 
proceedings, the liquidator is normally expected to perform his functions and exercise his powers effectively in 
the interest of all the parties, but, in practice, the parties have often been disillusioned by the liquidator’s 
performance. 
It is against this background that this Paper sets out to examine the status and role of the liquidator in 
the winding-up of companies in Nigeria, and to determine the measures that should be adopted to achieve 
effectiveness in the exercise of his powers and performance of his functions for the overall benefit of all the 
interested parties in the winding-up proceedings. 
 
2. Concept and Meaning of a Liquidator 
A liquidator is that person appointed for the purpose of conducting the proceedings in the winding-up of a 
company.4  The Black’s law dictionary defines a liquidator as the official charged with the winding-up of a 
company.5  In specific terms, a liquidator is a person appointed by the company or court to wind up the affairs of 
the company and to distribute its assets, if any, among the creditors and contributories in accordance with the 
Articles and rules of priority during winding- up.6  
A liquidator could be a provisional liquidator or a substantive liquidator.  However, irrespective of the 
prefix used in describing the liquidator, his functions are identifiable and specific.  A provisional liquidator is 
generally appointed where the assets of the company are in jeopardy and the primary objective of his 
appointment is to prevent the directors of the company from dissipating such assets of the company, and unless 
expressly restricted, therefore, the provisional liquidator has the authority of any liquidator vis-à-vis securing the 
                                                          
1    This is also referred to as winding-up by the Court. 
2   There are two types of voluntary winding-up, namely, Members’ Voluntary winding-up and Creditors’ Voluntary winding-
up. 
3    Cap. C.20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2010, ss. 425 – 431. 
4   E.O.A. Idowu, “Winding-Up of Companies” in E.O. Akanki, ed., Essays on Company Law (Lagos: University of Lagos 
Press, 1992) p. 266. 
5    H.C. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary 9th edn (St. Paul Minn: West Pub. Co. 1979) p. 931. 
6    N.C.S. Ogbuanya, Essentials of Corporate Law Practice in Nigeria (Lagos: Novena Publishers Ltd, 2010) p. 687. 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.20, 2016 
 
149 
safety of the properties that would appear to belong to the company being wound up.1  
 A distinction is sometimes drawn between a provisional liquidator and a provisional liquidator proper.  
The provisional liquidator proper is one appointed upon the presentation of winding-up petition or anytime 
thereafter but before the winding-up order is made.  The purpose is to preserve the assets of the company with a 
view to equitable distribution pursuant to the contingency of a winding-up order.2  A provisional liquidator 
proper can only be appointed pursuant to an effective petition already filed and properly before the court3 
usually upon information that the appointment of a provisional liquidator is of utmost necessity or that public 
interest dictates the appointment of one. 
 The provisional liquidator on the other hand, in compulsory winding-up, is the official receiver, usually, 
the Deputy Chief Registrar of the Federal High Court upon the making of a winding-up order, virtule officii (by 
virtue of office), with all the powers of a liquidator.4  It then becomes his duty to take possession and collect the 
assets of the company.5  The provisional liquidator continues in the office until confirmed as the substantive 
liquidator or a new one is appointed.    
 The liquidator’s role continues after the making of the winding-up order by the court.  He is one 
appointed out of or in court, responsible for the final rites of the company; responsible for distributing the assets 
of the company to contributories, paying creditors and if there is any balance, he pays it to the Companies 
Liquidation Account. 
 
3. Appointment of a Liquidator and Legal Consequences  
The CAMA has unequivocally declared that a liquidator is appointed for the purpose of conducting the 
proceedings in winding-up a company and performing such duties in reference thereto. 6  In a compulsory 
winding-up, the liquidator will be appointed by the court, that is, the Federal High Court, which has the 
exclusive powers over the winding-up processes, by the combined effect of section 567 of the CAMA and 
section 251 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999.  The liquidator will generally be appointed after the 
presentation of the winding-up petition and not before.  Therefore, at any time after the presentation of a petition 
and before the making of a winding-up order the appointment shall be “provisional” and the court making the 
appointment may limit and restrict the powers of the liquidator by the order appointing him. 7  The word 
“provisional” that qualifies a liquidator relates only to the period of his appointment.  The provisional liquidator 
has been judicially held to be in the same position as a receiver pendentelite.  He is not entitled to appear on a 
winding-up petition even though served; as he is not a party.  He is appointed only to preserve the property of 
the company pending the making of a winding-up order or such shorter period as the court may deem fit.8 
 In the case of Anakwenze and Ors v Tapp Industry Ltd and Ors,9 Uwaifo, JCA (as he then was) stated 
inter alia that: 
In law the provisional liquidator, although under the control of the court, stands generally 
within its restricted powers, in the place of the Board of Directors of Tapp Industries Ltd., 
see Re: Nawcon Ltd. (1969) 1 All E.R. 188 at 192.  It is however recognized that the Board 
may still exercise some residual powers such as instructing solicitors or counsel to oppose 
the Winding-Up or to contest certain actions of the Provisional Liquidator. 10  
 Although section 422 of the CAMA stipulates that a liquidator may be appointed upon the presentation 
of a petition, the courts have held that the provision should be read conjunctively with Rule 21(1) of the 
Winding-Up Rules which provides that:  
After the advertisement of a petition for the winding-up of a company by the court, upon 
the application of a creditor, or of a contributory, or of the company and upon proof by 
affidavit of sufficient grounds for the appointment of a provisional liquidator, the court, if 
it thinks fit and upon such terms as in the opinion of the court shall be just and necessary, 
make the appointment.11 
                                                          
1    Ibid., p. 40.  
2    Levy v Napier (1962) SC 468. 
3    Re: A. Company (1974) All E.R. 256. 
4  A.O. Alubo and A.M. Olong, “A Critical Appraisal of the Position of the Liquidator in the Winding-up of Companies in 
Nigeria,”  Modern Practice Journal of Finance and Investment Law Vol. 10 Nos. 1 – 2, (2006)  p. 80. 
5   Ibid. 
6   CAMA, s. 429(1). 
7   Ibid., s. 422(2). 
8   Ibid., p. 137. 
9   (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 202) 177 at 142. 
10   Ibid., p. 159. 
11   Companies Winding-Up Rules, Rule 21(1). 
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   Thus, in the case of Intercontra Limited v Messrs Golden Eagle Shipping Agencies Limited,1 the 
petitioner brought a petition to wind up the respondent/company on the grounds that the respondent/company 
was insolvent and unable to pay its debts; and that it was just and equitable to wind-up the company.  The court, 
upon an application, ordered that the petition be advertised in some national newspapers.  The petitioner later 
brought a motion under Order 33 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and Rule 21 (1) of 
the Companies Winding–Up Rules for the appointment of a provisional liquidator pending the order for the 
winding–up of the respondent.  The court held, striking out the application, that by virtue of Rule 21(1) of the 
Companies Winding-Up Rules, the advertisement of a petition is a condition precedent to the bringing of an 
application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator.2  The appointment can therefore be made only when 
an effective petition is pending and before a winding-up order is made.3 
 The principal purpose of appointing a provisional liquidator, as already alluded to, is to ensure that the 
assets of the company are preserved and the directors are prevented from dissipating them before the winding – 
up order can be made.  It follows therefore, that his first duty and indeed that of liquidators generally, is to 
preserve the company’s assets before a winding-up order can be made.4  
 In members’ voluntary winding-up of companies, the appointment of liquidators for the purpose of 
winding-up the affairs and distributing the assets of the company as well as the payment of remuneration of 
liquidators shall be made by the company.5  The appointment of a liquidator or liquidators may be made at the 
meeting where a resolution is passed.6  Usually, it is important to notify members through the notice of meeting 
that the liquidator(s) will be appointed.  It is obvious that even if there is failure to so notify members through 
the notice of meeting, the meeting could still make a valid appointment of liquidators.7  However, we suggest 
that the Winding-up Rules should provide that the appointment of a liquidator or liquidators should expressly be 
included as an item in the notice of meeting of the company or creditors for a resolution to wind-up a company 
compulsorily or voluntarily.  This is currently omitted under the Winding-Up Rules and could seriously affect 
resolutions reached at the meeting or result in unnecessary controversy as to the validity of the appointment, 
which would invariably be referred to the court for a decision. 
 It is also important to state that if a vacancy occurs by death, resignation or otherwise in the office of a 
liquidator appointed by the company, the company in general meeting may, subject to any arrangement with its 
creditors, fill the vacancy; and for that purpose a general meeting may be convened by any contributory or; if 
there were more liquidators than one, by the continuing liquidator.8 
 With respect to the appointment of a liquidator or liquidators in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, 
section 472 of the CAMA, directs the convening of creditors’ meeting as well as the company meeting 
simultaneously, where voluntary winding-up is proposed but not before an exhaustive statement of the affairs of 
the company is given.  The convening of creditors’ meeting is analogous to a declaration of insolvency.  At the 
respective meetings of the creditors and the company, a person to be appointed as a liquidator may be nominated 
for the purpose of winding-up the affairs of the company and distributing the assets of the company.  If different 
persons are respectively nominated, then the nominee of the creditors shall be the liquidator; and if no one is 
nominated by the creditors, then the company’s nominee becomes the liquidator. 
 In a winding-up subject to supervision,9 where an order is made, the court may by the same or any 
subsequent order, appoint an additional liquidator.10  The liquidator so appointed, shall have the same powers 
and be subject to the same obligations, and shall be in the same position, with the liquidator appointed in a 
voluntary winding-up. 11   The court has the powers to fill any vacancy occasioned by removal, death or 
resignation of a liquidator.  
 The appointment of a liquidator in a compulsory winding-up has the effect of rendering the board of 
directors, functus officio because the powers of the board of directors are assumed by the liquidator.  In this 
regard, section 422(9) of the CAMA provides that “If a liquidator is appointed under this section, all the powers 
of directors shall cease, except so far as the courts may by order sanction the continuance thereof”. 
This statutory provision received judicial interpretation in the case of NDIC v FMB,12 where Uwais, 
                                                          
1   (1985) FHNLR 45. 
2  Ibid., p. 48 C. 
3  See Re: A Company (1974) 1 All E.R. 256. 
4  Provisional Liquidator Tapp. Ind. v Tapp Industries Ltd. (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 393) 9 at 40. 
5  CAMA, s. 464. 
6  D. Sasegbon,  Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Law and Practice (Lagos: DS.C Pub. 1991) . 805. 
7  Ibid.  See Oakes v Turguad (1867) LR 2, HL 325, Re: Tubeless Tyre Co. (1990) WN 42.   
8  Winding-up Rules, Rule 41(8). 
9  Ibid., s. 486. 
10  Ibid., 489(1). 
11  Ibid., 489(2). 
12  (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 519. 
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JSC, held that “on the appointment of a provisional liquidator, the directors cannot exercise any of their powers 
unless the court grants them the leave to do so”.  Thus, the effect of the appointment of a liquidator under 
section 422(9) of the CAMA is the divestiture of the powers of its board of directors and the investiture of such 
powers on the liquidator. When this happens, the board is said to be functus officio.1  
In the case of Gbedu v Itie,2 one of the issues for the court’s determination was whether the trial judge 
was correct in holding that by operation of law, on the making of a winding-up order and appointment of a 
liquidator, the servants of a company affected are ipso facto dismissed?  
The Court of Appeal held that the effect of a winding-up order envisaged by the combined effect of 
section 422(1)(2) and (3) of the CAMA is, truly far-reaching.  In the first place, the appointment of a liquidator 
under section 422(9) upon the winding-up of a company has the effect of divesting the board of directors of its 
powers and vesting the same in the liquidator who assumes the powers and functions of the board. 
The court stressed that the exercise of the liquidator’s powers does not only supplant the powers of the 
board, but also actually negates the capacity of the company to sustain its contractual obligations. 
With regard to a contract of service, the court noted that in such a contract, both the employee and the 
employer (the company) have continuing obligations. While the employee has an obligation to work, the 
company has a duty to remunerate him for such exertions by way of payment of wages.  However, a winding-up 
order hampers a company’s capacity to sustain its obligations under the contract of service.  A winding-up order 
drains the company of all powers; particularly, powers of dealing with its assets and of the continued 
performance of its obligations.  By the winding-up order, a new officer, an officer of the court (the liquidator) 
inherits these powers.   
The court therefore held that the servants of the company must be deemed to know the legal effect of a 
winding-up order, on their employment, which is that such an order operates as a notice to them that the 
company cannot continue its obligations to them under the contract of service and this constitutes a breach going 
to the root of their contract.  What actually operates is not the fact of the winding-up but the notice implied in 
the making of the order.3 
The court therefore concluded that by the winding-up order and appointment of a liquidator, the 
servants of the company were discharged from the date of the order.  
It is significant to observe that the effect of a winding-up order and appointment of a liquidator on a 
contract of employment depends on whether the winding-up is compulsory or voluntary.4  The above case of 
Gbedu, illustrates the position under compulsory winding-up of companies. 
In a member’s voluntary winding-up, the effect of the appointment of liquidator(s) is that all the powers 
of the directors shall cease, except so far as the company in general meeting or the liquidator, sanctions the 
continuance thereof.5  Thus, upon the appointment of a liquidator, the directors become functus officio, except in 
special circumstances.  Similarly, in a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, upon the appointment of the liquidator or 
liquidators, the powers of the directors shall cease, except as the Committee of Inspection or the creditors 
sanction the continuance thereof.6 
 
4. Persons That May be Appointed as Liquidators 
The CAMA expressly excludes certain persons from being appointed to act as liquidators of a company.  In this 
regard section 509(1) of the Act provides as follows: 
The following persons shall not be competent to be appointed or to act as liquidator of a 
company, whether in a winding-up by court or under the supervision of the court or in a 
voluntary winding-up. 
(a) an infant 
(b) any one found by court to be of unsound mind; 
(c) a body corporate; 
(d) an undischarged bankrupt; 
(e) any person convicted of any offence involving fraud, dishonestly, official 
corruption or moral turpitude and in respect of whom there is a subsisting order 
under section 254 of this Act. 
 The appointment of those persons disqualified under the CAMA as liquidators will not only be a nullity 
but will also constitute a criminal offence.   
                                                          
1   Per Belgore JSC in NDIC v FMB Ltd, (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 519, at 933. 
2   (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 227. 
3  Nweze JCA, in his judgment relied on G.B. Graham, “The Effect of Liquidation on Contracts of Service” 15 MLR 52 
(1952).  See also M.R. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) p. 333. 
4   Smith and Wood, Industrial Law 4th edn. (London: Butterworths, 1989) 210.  
5  CAMA, s. 464(2). 
6   Ibid., s. 473(2). 
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 Though no reasons have been provided under the CAMA for the disqualification of these categories of 
persons as liquidators, it is possible to justify their exclusion.  Thus, an infant is excluded from being appointed 
a liquidator because of his intellectual and managerial limitations vis-à-vis the intricacies of the liquidator’s 
duties.  According to Sasegbon,1 “One can readily appreciate the disqualification of an infant.  His intellectual 
and commercial horizon is so limited that he cannot fit into the scheme”.  An infant in this context is a person 
below the age of twenty one years, which is the age of maturity under the Infant Relief Act, 1874.2 
 Also, persons who have been found to be of unsound mind by a competent court are disqualified from 
being appointed as liquidators.  It is obvious that the common law principle that a person of unsound mind has 
full capacity to enter into a binding contract, during his lucid intervals has no application to the issue of 
appointment of liquidators and managers.  This is because there can be no guarantee that a person of unsound 
mind will have his lucid period throughout the duration of his tenure as liquidator or manager.  The 
disqualification of such persons is therefore justified. 
 An undischarged bankrupt is also disqualified from appointment as a liquidator and manager unless the 
court which adjudged him bankrupt has given the leave to allow the bankrupt to act as a liquidator and 
manager.3  Under the Bankruptcy Act,4 a bankrupt is expressly disqualified from acting as a trustee of a trust 
estate,5 and from being admitted to practise any profession, for the time being, regulated by law.6  In the light of 
the foregoing, his disqualification from acting as a liquidator is therefore justified.   
Other persons who are statutorily disqualified from appointment as a liquidator include a director or 
auditor of the company and any one who had been convicted of any offence relating to fraud, dishonesty, official 
corruption or moral turpitude and who is disqualified under section 254 of the CAMA.   
However, the disqualification of a body corporate from being appointed as a liquidator is difficult to 
justify.  This is because a corporate body is competent for appointment as company secretary under the CAMA.7  
The disqualification of a body corporate in this regard, is one of the few instances where a company is denied 
the powers of a natural person of full capacity.8  It may be contended that the disqualification of a corporate 
body from appointment as a liquidator is based on the fact that in the performance of his duties, the liquidator is 
required to exercise due care and good faith; and natural persons are in a better position to fulfill such 
obligations. We, however, maintain that this reason is clearly unsatisfactory because the office of company 
secretary which a body corporate is statutorily allowed to occupy, also requires due diligence and good faith.  
Besides, a body corporate, in all cases, usually functions through human agents,9 as it has no hands or mind of 
its own.   
It is also significant to observe that apart from listing the persons who are disqualified from being 
appointed as a liquidator based on age, mental incapacity or previous conviction for fraud, among others, there 
are no prescribed academic or professional qualifications for liquidators.10  The effect therefore is that any 
person, who is not disqualified under the CAMA as aforestated, is not only qualified but competent to act as a 
liquidator.  This conclusion is supported by section 509(1) of CAMA which provides that “the following persons 
shall not be competent to be appointed or to act as liquidator of a company….”   This is a most unsatisfactory 
state of affairs. 
 
5. The Legal Status of a Liquidator 
The liquidator occupies a central position in the whole process of winding-up of companies.  If a liquidator is not 
appointed in a compulsory winding-up, then the Official Receiver11 is deemed to be the liquidator.   
                                                          
1   Sasegbon, Op. Cit. p. 632. 
2   A Received English Statute of General Application, see also Labinjoh v Abake (1924) 5 NLR 33.  
3   CAMA, s. 387(1)(d). 
4   Cap. B2, LFN, 2010. 
5   Ibid., s. 126(1)(f). 
6   Ibid., s. 126(1)(g). 
7   CAMA, s. 295(e). 
8   Ibid., s. 38. 
9   See Ekunola v CBN (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224 at 249 where the Supreme Court reiterated that a corporate entity has 
to perform through its accredited officers. 
10    The qualification of a company secretary, as contained in section 295 of the CAMA includes the following: (a) 
Membership of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administration. (b) A legal practitioner within the meaning of 
the Legal Practitioners Act. (c) A member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria or such other bodies of 
accountants as established from time to time by an Act.  Similarly, the qualification of an auditor as provided for in 
section 358 of the CAMA is membership of a body of Accountants in Nigeria established from time to time by an Act.  
Also under the English Insolvency Act 1986, a liquidator must be a qualified insolvency practitioner; who must be a 
member of a recognised professional body, such as The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, The Insolvency 
Practitioners Association etc. 
11   This is usually the Deputy Sheriff of the High Court. 
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It is not easy to state succinctly yet accurately the position occupied by a liquidator1 in relation to the 
winding-up of companies.   Indeed, there is no clear definition of the liquidator’s status; it is a mixture of 
common law and statutory duties and obligations.  He partakes partly of the nature of a trustee, partly of an 
agent of the company and partly of an officer of the company. 
(a) As Trustee:  A liquidator is clearly not a trustee in the strict sense of trusteeship, because the property 
of the company does not automatically vest in him2 as does trust property in trustees; although the court can 
make an order to vest the property in him.  However, the liquidator takes over the powers of directors who 
equally, without being trustees, owe fiduciary duties to the company.  His duty, like that of the directors, is owed 
to the company as a whole and not to individual contributories.  Also, like a trustee, he cannot buy the 
company’s property without leave of the court, or make a profit out of sales to the company.3  Moreover he is in 
a more vulnerable position than a lay trustee because he is always paid to assume his responsibility and in Re: 
Home and Colonial Insurance Co.,4 the court referred to the ‘high standard of care and diligence’ required from 
him.  ‘His only refuge was to apply to the court for guidance in every case of serious doubt or difficulty’.  
 Furthermore, although it has not been definitely decided, it does not appear that the liquidator can claim 
the protection of section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925 if he has acted honestly and reasonably and ought to be 
excused.  In Re: Windsor Steam Coal Ltd.,5 the Court of Appeal held on the facts that the liquidator had not 
acted reasonably in paying a claim without the directions of the court, but left open the question of whether 
section 61 of the Trustee Act was available as a defence.  
(b) As Agent:  Generally, a liquidator is regarded as an agent of the company; apparently because “the 
Companies Act… confers power on him equivalent to those of the directors while the company is a going 
concern, and if the winding-up is a compulsory one, because the Act requires him to have regard to the wishes of 
the members of the company as well as its creditors in exercising his powers”.6   Moreover, he is required to 
institute or defend action and execute documents in the name of the company.7   Keenan,8 maintains that the 
liquidator can be described as an agent for the company in that he can make contracts on behalf of the company 
for winding-up purposes. He has, of course, the paid agent’s obligation to bring reasonable skill to his duties.9  
However, he is not a true agent in that he controls the actions of his so-called principal, the company.10 
(c) As Officer:  The liquidator is not named as an officer of the company in the interpretation section of the 
CAMA11 but he is named in section 507 of the CAMA as one of the persons against whom proceedings may be 
taken for misfeasance.  Neither is it certain that he is entitled to the protection of the Companies Act 1985 
whereby the court can relieve any officer who, though negligent or in breach of trust, has acted honestly and 
reasonably and ought to be relieved.   
Orojo seems to capture the intricate nature of the position of the liquidator in a compulsory winding-up 
when he stated as follows:    
The liquidator is not only an officer of the Court, he is also an agent of the company for the 
purpose of winding-up the company and although he is in a fiduciary position, he is not a 
trustee for the individual creditors or contributories and so an action for damages will not 
lie against him, e.g. for delay, unless he is guilty of fraud, bad faith or personal 
misconduct.12 
However, a liquidator in a voluntary winding-up carries out his functions as an agent of the company13 
                                                          
1   A.J. Boyle, ed. Boyle & Bird’s Company Law 4th edn. (Bristol: Jordan Publishing Ltd, 2002) p. 672. 
2 CAMA, s. 440.  See also Birds et al, Op. Cit. p. 672, where the learned authors state that the House of Lords has confirmed 
that the liquidator is not a trustee in the strict sense. 
3  Winding-up Rules, Rules 144 provides that “Neither the Liquidator, nor any member of the Committee of Inspection of a 
company shall, while acting as Liquidator or member of such Committee, except by leave of Court, either directly or 
indirectly, by himself or any employer, clerk, agent or servant, become purchaser of any part of Ac company’s assets; 
and any purchase made contrary to the provisions of this Rule may be set aside by the Court on the application of the 
Ministry in a winding-up by the Court or of any creditor or contributory in any winding-up, and the Court may make 
such order as to costs as the court shall think fit”.  
4   (1929) All ER 231, 
5   (1929) 1 Ch. 151. 
6   Pennington’s Company Law, 4th ed., p. 735 quoted in A. Emiola, Nigerian Company Law (Ogbomosho: Emiola Publishers, 
2007) pp. 578 – 579. 
7   CAMA, s. 425. 
8   D. Keenan, Smith & Keenan’s Company Law for Students (London: Financial Times Management, 1996) p. 490. 
9   Ibid. 
10   Ibid. 
11 CAMA, s. 567 provides that “Officer” in relation to a body corporate, includes a director, manager or secretary. 
12  J. O. Orojo, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria 5th edn, (Durban: LexisNexis, 2008) p. 494. 
13  Re: Anglo-Moravian Hungarian Junction Railway Co. (1875) 1 ChD 130, CA; Knowles v Scott (1891) 1 Ch 717. 
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and not as an officer of the court. 1   In this respect, a voluntary liquidator’s position is like that of an 
administrative receiver.  A voluntary liquidator of a company must owe fiduciary duties to the company.  
However, a voluntary liquidator, unlike an administrative receiver, does not have additional liability on 
contracts imposed on him by statute.  Members and creditors of a company in liquidation have a right to compel 
the company and its liquidator to administer the company’s assets according to the law but they are not 
beneficiaries under a trust for sale of the assets.2  
 
6. Powers and Functions of a Liquidator 
The powers and functions of a liquidator are primarily contained in the CAMA, though they may also be 
specified in the deed of his appointment.  The powers specified in the deed of appointment are complimentary to 
the powers specified in the CAMA.   
 As an officer of the court, the liquidator is subject to the control and direction of the Court.  He has the 
right and power to apply to the court for directions as to how to perform his duties especially in the light of 
difficulties put in his way by some of the parties.3  
 By virtue of section 491(1) of the CAMA, the liquidator is mandated to publish in the gazette and in 
two daily newspapers and deliver to the Commission a notice of his appointment; and unless expressly restricted, 
he has the authority of any liquidator vis-à-vis securing the safety of the properties that would appear to belong 
to the company.  A liquidator possesses some powers that are judicial in nature.  Such powers that the Court is 
empowered to exercise under section 439 of the CAMA are delegated to the liquidator.  Accordingly, section 
439 of the CAMA must be read together with Rule 61 of the Winding-Up Rules, which provides as follows; 
(1) The duties imposed on the Court by subsection (1) of section 439 of the Act in a 
Winding-Up by the court with regard to the collection of the assets in discharge of 
the company’s liabilities shall be discharged by the liquidator subject to the control 
of the court. 
(2) For the purpose of the discharge by the liquidator of the duties imposed by 
subsection (1) of section 439 of the Act, and paragraph (1) of this rule the 
liquidator in a winding-up by the court shall, for the purpose of acquiring or 
retaining possession of the property of the company, be in the same position as if 
he were a receiver of the property appointed by the Court, and the court may on his 
application, enforce such acquisition or relation accordingly. 
Such powers which are delegable under the foregoing provisions include the collection and distribution 
of assets, settlement of the list of contributories, rectification of the register of members and making of calls in 
respect of shares which have not yet been paid for. 
A liquidator also owes a general duty to maintain an impartial attitude towards all those who have any 
interest in the assets of the company.  It is also his duty to the whole body of creditors and shareholders and the 
court to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of the company and not suppress or conceal 
anything coming to his knowledge in the course of his investigation which is material to ascertain the exact truth 
in every case before the court.4  The principal duties of the liquidator are therefore as follows: 
(a) To take into his custody, or under his control all the property and chooses in action to which the 
company is or appears to be entitled5 and he may apply to the court to have the property vested in him.6 
(b) To settle the list contributories in accordance with section 439 and rules 63 and 68 of the Winding-up 
Rules. 
(c) To collect as an officer of the court the assets of the company and apply them in the charge of its 
liabilities.7  
(d) To make, with leave of court or sanction of the committee of inspection8 calls on contributories in 
accordance with section 422 and 69 – 79 unless the court orders that no calls be made. 
(e) To distribute surplus assets among the members according to their rights.9  
(f) To have regard to any directions given by resolution of the creditors or contributories or by the 
committee of inspection; but the directions given by the creditors or contributories at general meeting 
                                                          
1  Re: John Bateson & Co. Ltd (1985) BCLC 259. 
2  Calgary & Edmonton Land Co. Ltd. v Dobinson (1974) Ch 102. 
3  Per Ogundare, JSC in Provisional Liquidator Tapp Ind. v Onyekwelu (1995) 5 SCNJ 120 at 139.    
4  Orojo, Op. Cit. p. 484.  Balogun v Agbaoge (1977) 3 FRCR 122.  
5  CAMA, s. 423. 
6  Ibid., s. 424. 
7  CAMA, s. 439(1) Winding-up Rules, Rules 61 and 102. 
8  Ibid., s. 453(2). 
9  Ibid., s. 446; Winding-up Rules, Rule 103. 
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will override those of the committee of inspection.1  
(g) To keep proper books as required by the CAMA2 and the Winding-up Rules.3  
(h) To pay money received by him into the companies liquidation account, in such manner and at such time 
as the commission may direct, and the Accountant General of the Federation will give him a Certificate 
of receipt of payment.4  
(i) To send to the Commission, at least twice a year, an account of his receipt and payments as liquidator.5  
(j) To send to the Commission, at prescribed intervals, a prescribed statement within one year.6  
(k) To pay into the companies liquidation account any money respecting unclaimed or undistributed assets 
of the company which have remained unclaimed or undistributed after six months of the receipt.  On 
such payment, the liquidator will receive a Certificate.7  
(l) To give to the official receiver such information and access to and facilities for inspecting the books 
and documents of the company and generally any aid required to enable him to perform his duties in 
relation to the liquidation.8 
 It is noteworthy that various powers are conferred on the liquidator to enable him carry out his duties.  
Most of the powers, in compulsory winding-up, are as set out in section 425 of the CAMA.  In addition, section 
453 provides that rules may be made delegating to liquidators the powers of the court in respect of the holding 
and conducting of meetings to ascertain the wishes of creditors and contributories, rectification of register, 
among others.  Some of these powers may be exercised by the liquidator at his discretion and without leave, 
while some of the powers can only be exercised with the leave of the court. 
 The powers which the liquidator, in a compulsory winding-up, may exercise subject to the sanction of 
either the Court or Committee of Inspection include the following: 
(a) Power to bring or defending action or other legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the 
company. 
(b) Power to carry on the business of the company so far as may be necessary for its beneficial winding-up.  
(c) Power to appoint a legal practitioner or any other relevant professional to assist him in the performance 
of his duties. 
(d) Power to pay any classes of creditors in full. 
(e) Power to make compromise or arrangement with creditors or persons claiming to be creditors or having 
or alleging themselves to have any claim against the company.  
(f) Power to compromise all calls and liabilities to calls, debts and liabilities and all claims between the 
company and a contributory and all questions relating to the assets of the company being wound-up.9 
Furthermore, without the leave of the court, the liquidator in a winding-up by the court, shall have 
power to: 
(a) sell the property of the company of whatever nature, by public auction or private contract, with power 
to transfer the whole thereof to any person or company or to sell the same in parcels; 
(b) do all acts and to execute, in the name and on behalf of the company, all deeds, receipts and other 
documents and for that purpose to use, when necessary, the company’s seal. 
(c) prove, rank and claim in bankruptcy, insolvency or sequestration of any contributory for any balance 
against his estate. 
(d) draw, accept, make and indorse any bill of exchange or promissory note in the name and on behalf of 
the company. 
(e) raise on the security of the assets of the company any money requisite. 
(f) take out letters of administration to the estate of any deceased contributory and to do in his official 
name any other act necessary for obtaining payment of any money due from a contributory or his estate 
which cannot be conveniently done in the name of the company. 
(g) appoint an agent to do any business which the liquidator is unable to do himself. 
(h) do all such other things as may be necessary for Winding-up the company and distributing its assets. 
The power to rectify the register of members can only be done with the special leave of court.10  
It is also important to examine the appointment and powers of the liquidator in voluntary winding-up of 
                                                          
1   Ibid., s. 427(1). 
2   Ibid., s. 430. 
3   Winding-up Rules, Rules 154 and 155. 
4   CAMA, s. 428. 
5   Ibid., s. 429. 
6   Ibid., s. 516(1) and (2). 
7   Ibid., s. 516(4). 
8   Ibid., s. 426. 
9   CAMA, s. 425(1)(a) – (f). 
10  CAMA, s. 453(2).  J.H. Farrar, et. al, Farrars’ Company Law 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1998) pp. 600 – 601. 
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companies.   Thus, section 464(1) of the CAMA which relates to the appointment of a liquidator in a members’ 
voluntary winding-up company in general meeting to appoint one or more liquidators for the purpose of 
winding-up the affairs and distributing the assets of the company; and the liquidator or liquidators may fix the 
remuneration to be paid to him or them and upon the appointment of the liquidator or liquidators, all the powers 
of the directors shall cease, except as sanctioned by the company in general meeting or permitted by the 
liquidator or liquidators.1   
In a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, the creditors and the company at their respective meetings may 
nominate a person to be the liquidator for the purpose of winding-up the affairs and distributing the assets of the 
company.   If the creditors and the company nominate different persons, the person nominated by the creditors 
shall be the liquidator; and if no person is nominated by the creditors, the person, if any, nominated by the 
company shall be the liquidator.2  Once a liquidator is appointed, the board of directors of the company shall 
become functus officio, as the liquidator takes over the exercise of its powers. 
On the powers of the liquidator in voluntary winding-up, the position of the law is that the liquidator 
may, in case of a members’ voluntary winding-up, with the sanction of a special resolution of the company, and 
in the case of a creditors’ voluntary winding-up, with the sanction of the Committee of Inspection or if there is 
no such Committees, a meeting of creditors, exercise any of the powers given by paragraphs d – f of section 425 
of the CAMA.3  It is also provided under the CAMA that the liquidator could settle the list of contributories, 
exercise the court’s powers of making calls, summon the general meeting of the company for the purpose of 
obtaining the sanction of the company by special resolution or for any purpose he may think fit,4 pay the debts 
of the company and adjust the rights of the contributories among themselves.5 
The liquidator’s power to make compromise or arrangement with creditors, with the sanction of the 
court or Committee of Inspection is quite significant as it could be skillfully employed for the benefit of all 
interested parties in the winding-up process.  Where this arrangement succeeds, it obviates the necessity of 
proceeding with the liquidation; as it has the effect of lifting the company out of its difficulties, by having them 
discharged by compounding or rendering the liabilities more manageable by the compromise.6   
 
7. Control of the Liquidator 
It has already been shown that the statutory powers and duties of a liquidator are enormous and susceptible to 
abuse.  The CAMA has therefore provided several institutional and personal measures for controlling the 
liquidator in the exercise of his powers and performance of his duties.  Thus, in order to ensure the due discharge 
of his duties, the liquidator is subject to the control of the court, the committee of inspection, the creditors, the 
contributories and the Corporate Affairs Commission.7 
 
7.1 Control by the Court 
The liquidator as an officer of the court is subject to the control and direction of the court.   Indeed, the exercise 
of his powers in a compulsory winding-up is subject to the control of the court8 which will ensure that he “acts 
fairly and honourably in dealing with persons who have claims adverse to his own, and he does not merely stand 
on his rights at law or in equity”.9  Therefore, the liquidator can freely apply to the court for directions in 
relation to any matter arising under the winding – up.10  Similarly, any creditor or contributory who is aggrieved 
by an act or decision of the liquidator may apply to the court for such order as it thinks just.11 
 
7.2 Control by Committee of Inspection, Creditors and Contributories 
The liquidator is also controlled by the Committee of Inspection, creditors and contributories in the exercise of 
his powers and performance of his functions.  The Committee of Inspection is usually appointed to act with and 
supervise the liquidator.12  The liquidator in the administration and distribution of the assets of the company 
among its creditors must have regard to directions given by resolution of the creditors or contributories at any 
                                                          
1  CAMA, s. 464(2). 
2  Ibid., s. 473. 
3  Ibid., s. 481(1). 
4  Ibid.,  s. 481(2). 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Orojo, 5th edn. Op. Cit. p 489. 
8  CAMA, s. 425(3). 
9  See Halsbury’s “Laws of England”, 4th edn. p. 649. 
10  CAMA, s. 427(3). 
11  Ibid., s. 427(5). 
12  CAMA, s. 433(1). 
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general meeting, or by the committee of inspection.1\ 
 
7.3 Control by Corporate Affairs Commission 
The liquidator is statutorily enjoined,2 at the risk of penal sanction,3 to notify the Corporate Affairs Commission 
of his appointment within fourteen days of the said appointment. With regard to the issue of control over the 
liquidators, the CAMA provides that “The Commission shall take cognizance of the conduct of liquidators of 
companies which are being wound up by the Court”.4  If the liquidator does not perform his duties faithfully, or 
if any complaint is made to the Commission by any creditor or contributory about the winding-up, the 
Commission must inquire into the matter and take such actions as it deems fit.5  
 The Commission may also, at any time, require the liquidator answer any inquiry in relation to the 
winding-up in which he is engaged; and if the Commission thinks fit, it may apply to the court to examine the 
liquidator or any other person on oath, concerning the winding-up of the company.6 
 Where the winding-up is subject to supervision, the liquidator can perform his functions without 
sanction or intervention of the court or the control of the Corporate Affairs Commission.  This legal proposition 
is supported by the provision of section 490 of the CAMA and the case of Corporate Affairs Commission v 
Davis,7 the facts of which are that in June 2001, the directors of Calabar Cement Company Ltd. were by special 
resolution authorized to present a petition for the voluntary winding-up of the company at the Federal High 
Court, Calabar.  The petition was duly presented for the winding-up of the company subject to the supervision of 
the court.  Upon the application of the shareholders, the respondent was appointed by the court as provisional 
liquidator of the company.  After the affairs of the company were fully wound up, a final general meeting was 
held on the 16th July, 2003 in which the account of the liquidation exercise was laid before the members.  
Sometime in 2003, the respondent received a letter from the Corporate Affairs Commission, the appellant, 
intimating him of the its intention to verify the records of the liquidation exercise.  On 3 rd November, 2003, 
representatives of the appellant appeared at the respondent’s office and demanded that all the vouchers, receipts, 
bank statements and other books of accounts in respect of the liquidation exercise be produced for their 
inspection.  Based on this, the respondent filed a motion on notice pursuant to Order 47 rule 5(1) of the Federal 
High Court Rules in which he sought for the orders of prohibition and injunction against the appellant, and the 
trial court granted the orders against the appellant. 
 Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the winding-up of the 
company was conducted under the supervision of the Corporate Affairs Commission. One of the two grounds of 
appeal formulated by the appellant was “whether in a winding-up process under the supervision of the court, the 
liquidator is subject to the control/supervision of the Corporate Affairs Commission in exercising his power 
under the Companies and Allied Matters Act”.    The court held that for the purposes of winding-up under the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act, the specific provisions contained in sections 401 – 536 of the Act are to be 
reckoned with and not the general provisions relating to functions of the appellant/Commission as contained in 
section 7(1)(a) of the enactment.  The court reiterated that where an issue in a statute is governed by a general 
provision and a specific provision, the latter will be invoked in the interpretation of the issue before the court; 
because the specific provision will be deemed to have anticipated the issue as against the general provision.8  
Relying on section 490(1) of a CAMA, the court further held that the respondent being a liquidator in a winding 
up, subject to the supervision of the court, is not subject to any of the provisions of the CAMA enumerated in 
the Twelfth Schedule to the Act, and a fortiori, he is not subject to any of the controls in section 432 of the Act, 
including “the direction of a local investigation of the books and vouchers of the liquidator”.  The court 
therefore concluded that the appellant/Commission had no power of control, as such, in the winding-up, outside 
the provisions of sections 427 to 432 of the CAMA, which provisions were not applicable in the instant case.   
 The effect of this decision is clearly that the extent to which the Corporate Affairs Commission could 
exercise its power of control over a liquidator in a winding-up that is subject to the courts supervision is 
restricted. 
 
 
                                                          
1  Ibid., s. 427(1). 
2  CAMA, s. 491(1). 
3  Ibid. s. 491(2). 
4  Ibid., s. 432(1). 
5  Orojo, Op. Cit. p. 489. 
6   CAMA, s. 432(2). 
7   (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 60. 
8  See The M V Panormos Bay & Ors. v Olam Nigeria Plc (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 1 at 13; Schroder & Co. v Major & Co. 
(Nig.) Ltd. (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 1; Kraus Thompason Orgainsation v National Institute for Policy and Strategic 
Studies (NIPSS) (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 901) 44 at 65. 
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8. Vacation of Office by Liquidator 
In a compulsory winding-up, the liquidator appointed by the court may resign or be removed in certain defined 
instances and such vacancy shall be filled by the court.  In the case of removal, the Official Receiver summons 
meetings at the request of not more than 1/10 in value of the creditors and contributories.1   In the case of 
resignation, separate meetings of creditors and contributories are summoned, where the liquidator’s resignation 
is discussed and a decision taken on whether to accept the resignation or not.2  If it is agreed at the meeting by 
ordinary resolution that the resignation should be accepted, then the liquidator files the memorandum of his 
resignation with the registry of the court while also notifying the official receiver.   
 In voluntary winding up, the death, resignation or removal of the liquidator(s) may create a vacancy.  
Such vacancies may be filled by appointing another liquidator by the company in general meeting, 3  but 
sometimes after consultation with the creditors or by allowing the other liquidator(s) continue where there were 
more than one. 
 
9. Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is firmly settled that a liquidator may be appointed upon the presentation of a winding-up petition and not 
before.  After the making of the winding-up order by the court, the winding-up process continues with the 
identification and stock- taking of the company’s assets, compilation and settlement of the list of creditors and 
contributories and eventual distribution of the assets to all interested parties based on approved order of priority.  
These procedures are complex and highly technical; involving the administration of the company’s property, 
series of meetings with creditors and contributories, applications to the court for directions and generally taking 
and executing instructions from the court.  The performance of these functions falls primarily on the liquidator, 
though other officers such as the official receiver, special manager and members of the committee of inspection 
are often involved.  We have noted that despite his enormous powers and functions, the law has provided no 
professional qualifications for the office of the liquidator and receiver.  Accordingly, any person who is not 
expressly disqualified under the law can act as a liquidator.  This is not appropriate as the CAMA has prescribed 
professional qualifications for other professionals such as company secretaries and auditors.   
 With regard to those who are disqualified from being appointed as liquidators, the provisions of the 
CAMA are clearly in conflict with those of the BOFIA and NDIC Act.  Thus, while the CAMA disqualifies a 
body corporate from appointment as liquidators, the BOFIA and NDIC Act expressly provide for the 
appointment of a body corporate, namely, the NDIC, as liquidator.  This conflict must be resolved by effecting 
the necessary amendment to the CAMA to exclude a body corporate from those who are disqualified as 
liquidators and receivers.  It has been noted that section 55(2) of the BOFIA provides to the effect that “where 
any of the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the BOFIA, 
the provisions of the BOFIA shall prevail”.   However, the real issue is not which of the two Acts shall prevail in 
the event of conflict in provisions, but whether a body corporate is capable of acting as a liquidator?.  We insist 
that since a body corporate could act as a liquidator of a bank, it could also act as a liquidator of any other 
company.   However, where a company is appointed as a liquidator, the actual officers of the company charged 
with the responsibility of conducting the winding-up proceeding must be qualified liquidation practitioners. 
 The enormous and highly technical duties of the liquidators and receivers equally call for qualified and 
competent persons to hold these offices to ensure effective performance.  Neither the CAMA nor any of the other 
related statutes has provided for the professional qualifications of those competent to practise as liquidators and 
receivers in Nigeria.  It is therefore recommended that apart from providing for those who are disqualified from 
being appointed as liquidators and receivers, the laws should also prescribe minimum professional qualifications 
and number of years of relevant experience for liquidators and receivers in the same manner as it is done for 
company secretaries and auditors. This will enable the approved professional bodies to also monitor the 
conduct and practice of the liquidators and receivers, as the court alone is not in the position to provide the 
requisite high level of effective monitoring and control.   
 It is further observed that the principal criticisms of the liquidation process include procedural delays, 
high liquidation costs and low recoveries for general unsecured creditors.4  Therefore, a more efficient and less 
costly liquidation process will return higher dividends to creditors, thereby minimising their losses.  In this 
direction, the practical skills of the liquidators and receivers must be strengthened through continuous training, 
workshops and seminars, so as to raise their performance standards and efficiency.  
                                                          
1  Ibid., s. 422(5) and Winding-up Rules, Rule 41(7). 
2  Winding-up Rules, Rule 150. 
3  CAMA, s. 465. 
4  G.E. Meyeman and G.W. Johnson, “Reforming the Insolvency System in South Africa: An Interpretative Summary” USAID, 
2011. 
